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Reply
Hard Look Review in a World of Techno-
Bureaucratic Decisionmaking:
A Reply to Professor McGarity
Mark Seidenfeld
I. Introduction
Having staked out a scholarly position that touts the administrative
state as holding the greatest promise for regulation in the "public
interest,"' I initially thought it ironic that I am engaged in a debate about
judicial review with Professor McGarity, a scholar who, like me, sees
value in reliance on expert administrative agencies to implement regulatory
statutes. 2 For this reason, I felt a need to clarify why my views on judicial
review differ from those of Professor McGarity.
II. The Need to Temper Agency Techno-Bureaucratic Decisionmaking
Professor McGarity analogizes agency decisionmaking to that of a
large corporation. Both administrative agencies and corporations rely on
institutional structures to make decisions that depend on a complex set of
factors. Thus, Professor McGarity suggests that "techno-bureaucratic
rationality," rather than "comprehensive analytical rationality," is the
appropriate mode of decisionmaking for agencies as well as corporations.3
1. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV.
L. REV. 1511, 1541-42 (1992) (arguing that administrative agencies are well-suited to making deli-
berative policy decisions because they act without direct pressure from popular opinion).
2. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Beyond the HardLook.A New Standardfor Judicial Reiew?, NAT.
REsouRcES& ENV'T, Fall 1986, at 32, 33 (concluding that, because of inherent complexities, scientific
policy decisions are best made by agencies with relevant expertise); Thomas 0. McGarity, The
Expanded Debate over the Future of the Regulatory State, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1463, 1513 & n.253
[hereinafterMcGarity, TheExpandedDebate] (characterizing himselfas an "unrepentantprotectionist"
who believes in regulatory intervention to solve existing social problems).
3. Thomas 0. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemakfng:A Response to Professor
Seidenfeld, 75 TEXAS L. REv. 525, 537-38 (1997) [hereinafter McGarity, Response]. Professor
McGarity has more fully explained the terms "comprehensive analytical rationality" and "techno-
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He then goes on to argue that hard look review is not consistent with this
mode of decisionmaking.4
I agree with Professor McGarity that techno-bureaucratic rationality
is a valid, and probably the most appropriate, mode of agency
decisionmaking. As Professor McGarity acknowledges, however, admini-
strative agencies are not exactly like private corporations.' Corporations
are disciplined by the competitive market. When market imperfections ren-
der competition incapable of ensuring that corporate activity furthers the
public good, corporations are subject to the scrutiny of the very admini-
strative agencies whose decisionmaking process Professor McGarity analo-
gizes to that of corporations. Government agencies, however, are usually
subject neither to discipline by the competitive marketplace nor comprehen-
sive oversight by other agencies. Agencies also make decisions that,
backed by the coercive power of the state, mandate the behavior of other
entities; if a regulated entity violates an administrative rule or order,
it is subject to penalties and its officers are sometimes subject to
imprisonment.' For these reasons, I believe that some form of hard look
review, such as the modified version I propose in my initial article, should
play an important role in ensuring against abuse of agency discretion.
Without such review, I question the legitimacy of leaving this coercive
power in the hands of officials who are not directly electorally accountable.
Professor McGarity appears to believe that agency decisions are
justified so long as those decisions remain within the bounds set by
Congress when it authorizes agency action. He reasons that it is difficult
to get Congress to overcome the influence of powerful "self-interest
groups" such as manufacturing associations.7 For Professor McGarity,
once Congress overcomes the hurdles put in place by a political system
biased towards moneyed self-interest, the agency should have carte blanche
to implement the progressive agenda that underlies that agency's autho-
rizing statute.8
bureaucratic rationality" in THOMAS 0. McGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF
REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 5-6 (1991) [hereinafter McGARITY,
REINVENTING RATIONALITY].
4. See McGarity, Response, supra note 3, at 538-49 (stating that the evidentiary demands imposed
on agencies by the hard look doctrine prohibit agencies from maintaining a techno-bureaucratic
approach).
5. See id. at 526-27 (noting that private corporations are subject to market controls while agencies
are subject to controlling factors such as the press and interagency review).
6. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1994); Occupational Safety and Health Act
of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 6 66(e)-(g) (1994); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c) (1994).
7. See McGarity, Response, supra note 3, at 530-31.
8. See McGarity, 71te EspandedDebate, supra note 2, at 1517 (justifying regulatory intervention
on the grounds that "Congress enacted most regulatory statutes to protect some citizens from the
adverse consequences of the profit-maximizing activitie of corporations and other citizens").
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I have several problems with this justification.9 First, it does not
support the legitimacy of agency action when Congress intends a statute to
further the interests of entities other than public interest groups. Professor
McGarity thus implicitly requires courts to distinguish those statutes passed
to further a public-interest-oriented regulatory agenda from others. As a
practical matter, distinguishing public interests from private ones could
embroil the courts in inquiries that will make judicial discretion in applying
hard look review pale by comparison. 10 For example, if Congress were
to adopt a statute intended to grant labor unions increased power to resist
employer efforts to break strikes, I cannot envision how a court would go
about determining whether the interests of organized labor are public or
private in nature.
Second, and perhaps more significant for statutes like those protecting
the workplace or environment on which Professor McGarity focuses,
Congress rarely enacts legislation with one purpose in mind. Congress
passes statutes to address problems it identifies, and usually the provisions
of a statute reflect some balance of the affected interests." For example,
9. Although Professor McGarity's basis for regulatory intervention adds an explanation for
Congress's actions, it is essentially grounded in the "legal process" justification for agency authority
to regulate. According to the legal process school, agencies' expertise and ability to develop experience
with particular regulating domains give the administrative state a comparative advantage for developing
policies best suited to achieve the purposes underlying the agencies' authorizing statutes. See Keith
Werhan, The Neoclassical Revival in Administrative Law, 44 ADMIN. L. REv. 567, 576-83 (1992)
(describing the historical influence of the legal process school on administrative law); see also William
N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement: Moderation as a Postmodern Cultural
Form, 89 MICH. L. REv. 707, 710 (1991) (arguing that the post-New Deal era legal process view vali-
dated the role of regulatory agencies without undermining their flexibility); Thomas 0. Sargentich,
Teaching Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 1 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 147, 155-56 (1992)
(explaining that the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 provided a procedural check on agency
decisionmaking without disturbing the agency's policymaking discretion). The legal process justi-
fication, however, fails to confront seriously the fact that Congress does not resolve the value-laden
choices between conflicting regulatory purposes and leaves many of these choices for the agencies to
decide when implementing their authorizing statutes. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron:
Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEXAs L.
REv. 83, 93 (1994) (noting that legal process proponents view the agency, not the courts, as the proper
entity to make determinations regarding the technical aspects of statutory interpretation).
10. For Professor McGarity, "a clear distinction exists... between a group composed of entities
seeking primarily to enrich themselves and an association of individuals attempting to achieve broader
ends that may or may not directly benefit those individuals." McGarity, Response, supra note 3, at
532 n.29. For me the distinction is not so clear. For example, consider an environmental organization
that lobbies the legislature and advocates pro-environmental positions in agency proceedings. This is
probably McGarity's quintessential public interest group. Nonetheless, the workers and leaders of such
a group often receive recognition and salaries for their efforts and thus have a financial and reputational
stake in the continued existence and success of the group's activity. Also, many individuals contribute
to the group in hopes of preventing degradation of the environmentand preserving the aesthetic quality
around their houses and other land that they own. For these individuals, environmental concerns
coincide with economic interests.
11. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RiGHTS REVOLUTION: REcONCEIVING THE REGULATORY
STATE 124 (1990) ("There will be not one but many purposes in any statute; those purposes will
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in passing the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), Congress
intended to reduce risks to worker health and safety, but not at all costs.
Thus, although one might characterize OSHA as meant to further work-
place safety, and perhaps even claim that workplace safety is a public
rather than a private interest, in fact Congress intended OSHA to change
the point of balance between workers' and employers' interests. Yet
Congress rarely specifies the balance of interests in detail in the statutory
provisions it enacts. Rather, it leaves discretion to the agency to engage
in the inherently political act of balancing those interests.12 Congress may
grant this political discretion with respect to matters on which it cannot
decide or even matters that it never envisioned when it passed the authori-
zing statute in the first place. Hence, one cannot justify agency authority
by claiming that Congress dictated the outcome of every fundamental regu-
latory controversy that the agency confronts. Nor can one justify such
grants of political power by Congress's authority to overrule agency rules
if it finds them objectionable; Congress's lack of time to address detailed
regulatory concerns and the inertia built into the legislative process render
the potential for an explicit statutory rejection of a rule an insufficient
check on such broad grants of power to agencies.13
For me, the promise of the administrative state stems from the possi-
bility of institutional checks placed on the decisionmaking process that can
help ensure both that agencies seek to implement some commonly accepted
view of the public good and that their ultimate decisions do not deviate too
greatly from that mark. These checks include the internal structure of the
decisionmaking process as well as external checks by the President,
Congress, and the courts. Judicial review plays a key role in reinforcing
internal agency structures that encourage regulations to reflect a diversity
of professional perspectives and not the idiosyncratic values of a particular
office within an agency. Thus, although I agree that techno-bureaucratic
rationality rather than comprehensive analytical rationality is a valid mode
of agency decisionmaking, I also believe that, when used by an agency,
sometimes conflict with one another, and they will have been compromised and traded off in complex
ways."); Frank H. Easterbrook, WhatDoes Legislative History Tell Us?, 66 CHI.-KENT L. RnV. 441,
446-47 (1990) ("Statutes are drafted by multiple persons, often with conflicting objectives."); Abner
J. Mikva, A Reply to Judge Starr's Observations, 1987 DUKE L.J. 380, 380-81 (illustrating the com-
promise involved in the passage of a particular strip mining law).
12. See Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 676-85
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (reviewing the legislative history of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act (OSHA) and concluding that Congress intentionally left the agency with discretion to decide
the extent to which OSHA's standards for toxic substances were meant to impose financial burdens on
industry).
13. See Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 1551 (describing factors that contribute to congressional
inability to oversee agency policymaking meaningfully); Seidenfeld, supra note 9, at 98-99 (noting that
the general inefficiency of the legislative process is exacerbated by factors such as the size of Congress,
the need for a majority in both houses and presidential approval, and the committee system).
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techno-bureaucratic decisionmaking must be tempered to ensure that agen-
cies do not abuse the discretion inherent in such a system to such an extent
that the resulting rules they promulgate fail to comport with the balance of
values that undergird their authorizing statutes.
Having clarified my theoretical points of agreement with and differ-
ence from Professor McGarity, I proceed to address some of his particular
arguments for why hard look review, even as I would operationally modify
it, is not a good idea.
II. Judicial Review as a Check on Abuses of Techno-Bureaucratic
Rationality
Professor McGarity believes that hard look review aims for an ideal
of "comprehensive analytical rationality" that is impossible for an agency
to achieve.14 He argues that the constraints of "inadequate data, unquanti-
fiable values, mixed societal goals, and political realities" force an agency
to rely on its "hands-on experience," rather than some idealized analytic
process, to make the tough decisions needed to adopt regulations.15
Although I agree that hard look review has been used by some courts to
demand more generation and analysis of data than agencies can reasonably
be expected to provide, I also believe that many of the demands of hard
look review have value as applied to techno-bureaucratic decisionmaking.
A. The Benefits of Hard Look Review Applied to Techno-Bureaucratic
Decisionmaking
Because agencies must make decisions with less than perfect infor-
mation, in the face of competing claims for agency resources, and with a
need to balance very real political pressures, agency decisionmaking ulti-
mately involves choices of heuristics that enable the agency to reach a
determination in light of such pragmatic constraints.' 6 Certainly agency
experience will be relevant in making such choices; experience may give
14. McGarity, Response, supra note 3, at 538 (arguing that the judicial preference for compre-
hensive analytical rationality prevents agencies from adopting the more effective techno-bureaucratic
approach).
15. Id. (quoting McGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY, supra note 3, at 5-6). Professor
McGarity's "techno-bureaucratic rationality" is essentially an example of an exercise in "bounded
rationality." See generally Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON.
99 (1955) (formulating a pragmatic theory of rationality subject to decisionmaking constraints, such as
the inability of an individual to consider all alternatives or to distinguish between the desirability of all
outcomes).
16. For a comprehensive sample of papers addressing how individuals use heuristics as cognitive
shortcuts for decisionmaking and the potential biases to which their use leads, see generally JUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982). For a brief dis-
cussion in the legal literature of how heuristics relate to "bounded rationality," see Adam J. Hirsch,
Inheritance and Inconsistency, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1057, 1149-51 (1996).
19971
Texas Law Review
the agency a special appreciation for the risks inherent in one choice or
another.17 But as I pointed out in my initial article, an agency's structure
can lead its staff members to choose decisionmaking heuristics without rec-
ognizing that their choices are essentially dictated by professional values
rather than science and without consideration of alternatives that reflect
different values.18
My experience as an agency lawyer leads me to believe that, without
some external constraint on agency decisionmaking processes, staff mem-
bers are apt to take shortcuts to avoid extra work, to yield to short-run
political pressures that take time and energy to counter, or to alter a deci-
sion to make it easier to defend to their superiors. For example, a staff
member who has spent several years studying how to regulate a purported
problem will have a harder time explaining to a superior what she has been
doing with her time if she concludes that regulation is unnecessary than if
she comes up with a proposed regulation. Generally, shortcuts based on
a staff member's experience are necessary in light of the pragmatic infor-
mation and resource constraints on agency rulemaking.19 But shortcuts
that staff members take are often inappropriate. Staff members frequently
will not even be aware that they are taking inappropriate shortcuts; if the
culture in an agency office is to resolve an issue in a particular manner, the
staff member usually will not contemplate competing alternatives to the
standard resolution.' °
17. As then-Judge Breyer pointed out, agency staff members are more likely to understand the
relative significance of risks posed by agency decisions and less likely to react in a short-sighted panic.
See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 48-49
(1993).
18. See Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify
Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEXAs L. REV. 483,505-07 (1997); see also
HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES IN
ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION 47-51 (3d ed. 1976) (noting that choices of intermediate ends by
agencies involve both factual judgments and value choices); Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein,
Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 48-49 (1995) (arguing that the difference
between lay and expert evaluations of risk reflect value choices when citizens' judgments do not rest
on demonstrable.cognitive errors).
19. This phenomenon is not limited to decisionmaking by agency staff members. People in
general need to limit their choices and the information at which they look in order to make everyday
decisions in our complex world. See generally Simon, supra note 15.
20. Psychological studies have shown that scientists engaged in public-policy decisionmaking base
factual decisions on covert, untested scientific theories, and that such bases lead to disagreement and
destructive strategies that block the formation of rational policy. See Kenneth R. Hammond et al.,
Improving Scientists'Judgements ofRisk, 4 RISK ANALYSIS 69, 70 (1984); see also Wendy E. Wagner,
The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1613, 1628-31 (1995) (describing
how agencies engage in a "science charade" by treating many policy choices as if they were scien-
tifically determined). These studies also show that forcing scientists to confront the cognitive
shortcomings of their decisionmaking processes "makes it possible to discover and compare the source
of differences in scientists' judgments, and thus to aid in their revision [of their values] when
appropriate." Hammond, supra, at 70; cf. Simon, supra note 15, at 115 (noting that his model of
[Vol. 75:559
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Hard look review is useful as a means of getting an agency to recog-
nize that its choices often involve values and of avoiding the pitfalls of
unthinkingly making such choices by inappropriately taking shortcuts.
Active judicial review of the agency decisionmaking process can give staff
an incentive (and perhaps power) to resist political pressure from agency
higher-ups to reach preordained results. It can empower staff members
outside the lead office responsible for promulgating a rule and compel
serious consideration of their concerns. It can force staff members from
the lead office responsible for a rule not to follow their gut blindly without
first considering whether alternative decisionmaking criteria might be
appropriate, then asking whether additional information and analyses would
be useful, and finally consulting with those who might not share their
potentially provincial professional perspective. The value of the hard look
doctrine, when applied to a techno-bureaucratic rational process, depends
on retaining those aspects of the doctrine that encourage the agency to
think through its decisions without imposing on the agency requirements
to collect and analyze information merely to satisfy a court that it has done
a careful job.
B. Evidence That Hard Look Review Provides These Benefits
Professor McGarity appears to doubt that judicial review will increase
the propensity of agencies to scrutinize their rules carefully. For example,
he states that he is "absolutely confident that sensible agency heads would
seek diverse professional perspectives from agency staff.., even in the
complete absence of judicial review."2 History suggests, however, that
prior to judicial demands under hard look review, agencies often ignored
such perspectives and that agency decisions reflected capture by the
bounded rationality involves not only rational pursuit of outcomes within a given set of limits to render
decisionmaking tractable but also rational setting of these limits given the capabilities of the
decisionmaker).
The current Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) investigation of the explosion of Trans World Airlines Flight 800 illustrates how heuristic
biases can drive agency decisionmaking. Safety board engineers, who frequently investigate crashes
caused by mechanical failure, believe that the explosion was probably caused by such failure. See
Matthew Purdy, Many Answers in Crash Except the One That Counts, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 15, 1996,
§ 1 at 1. FBI investigators, who routinely investigate bombings, surmise that the crash was likely the
result of a bomb. See id. When asked why, an NTSB engineer replied: "Because there is no evidence
of a bomb." Id. (paraphrase). Responding to the same question, an FBI investigator explained:
"Because there is no evidence of mechanical failure." Id. (paraphrase). Thus, what cognitive
psychologists label the "availability heuristic"-the tendency of decisionmakers to over-estimate the
probability of events that come easily to their minds-seems to drive the difference in attribution of the
cause of the explosion by the FBI and the NTSB. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,
Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207, 208
(1973).
21. McGarity, Response, supra note 3, at 533 n.34.
1997]
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regulated.' Moreover, at least one insider (who worked as a lawyer for
the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Office of General Counsel)
agrees with me that hard look review is imperative if the staff members
from lead offices are to take the concerns of those from other offices
seriously.'
Professor McGarity counters that "fears of renegade agencies may
have had some force in the early 1970s, when executive and congressional
oversight mechanisms had yet to evolve,... [but] in the mid-1990s [they]
have [an] artificial ring .... "24 As I pointed out in my primary article,
political review helps cabin the bottom-line outcome of agency rulemaking,
but does little to ensure that the agency carefully deliberates as part of its
rulemaking process. 5  In fact, I am somewhat surprised by Professor
McGarity's response, given his persuasive demonstration that oversight by
President Reagan's Office of Management and Budget, purportedly to
ensure rationality of agency decisionmaking, in fact merely operated to
filter out agency rules adverse to the President's pro-industry
constituency.2
In addition, particular rulemaking proceedings demonstrate to me that,
coupled with a deferential pass-fail standard of review, political pressure
can actually discourage careful agency analysis. For example, prompted
by pressures from the religious right, in 1988 the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) adopted regulations prohibiting federally sub-
sidized family planning facilities from counseling clients about abortion.27
The major issue of administrative law facing the agency was the interpre-
tation of section 1008 of the Public Health Act. HHS perceived itself as
facing review under the Chevron doctrine, which at the time required
courts to defer to any agency interpretation of a statute that was reasonable
and did not contravene clear congressional understandings of how the stat-
22. For example, it was judicial demands for focus on environmental factors that lead to the
statutory demands of the National Environmental Policy Act that agencies consider environmental
impacts of their decisions. Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN.
L. REV. 1189, 1298-99 (1986).
23. See William F. Pederson, Jr., Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38,
53-60 (1975).
24. McGarity, Response, supra note 3, at 536.
25. See Seidenfeld, supra note 18, at 501-02.
26. See MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY, supra note 3, at 69-70.
27. The adopted regulations, Prohibition on Counseling and Referral for Abortion Services, 42
C.F.R. § 59.8 (1995) [hereinafter Abortion Counseling Regulations], collectively and popularly known
as the "gag rule," were the subject of a memorandum from President Clinton, see Presidential
Memorandum, The Title X "Gag Rule," 58 Fed. Reg. 7455 (1993), which resulted in the Secretary
of HHS suspending and rescinding the regulations, see Standards of Compliance for Abortion-Related
Services in Family Planning Service Projects, 58 Fed. Reg. 7462 (1993) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R.
§ 59) (suspending the regulations); Standards of Compliance for Abortion-Related Services in Family
Planning Service Projects, 58 Fed. Reg. 7464 (1993) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 59) (providing
notice of proposed rulemaking for rescinding the regulations).
566 [Vol. 75:559
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ute would apply to a particular issue.' The agency used the leniency of
the Chevron doctrine as an excuse not to analyze the likely impact of its
rule; the agency explicitly stated that it had met its burden of analysis
because the rule "is reasonable in light of all the circumstances."29 The
experience of HHS's gag rule leads me to believe that if the courts were
to adopt a pass-fail test for the Administrative Procedure Act's arbitrary
and capricious review of rules, agencies frequently would aim to structure
rules that merely satisfy political concerns and minimize the agency's
workload rather than attempt to develop the best rule given existing prag-
matic constraints.'
IV. The Problems Caused by Applying Hard Look Review to Techno-
Bureaucratic Rationality
In addition to expressing skepticism about the consistency of hard look
review and techno-bureaucratic rationality, Professor McGarity also asserts
that I "missed the more serious and debilitating impact of judicially re-
quired changes in the way agencies go about analyzing and resolving regu-
latory problems."31 I agree with Professor McGarity that the hard look
doctrine as applied by many courts has required agencies to engage in
analysis for its own sake. I am more sanguine than he, however, about the
prospects of modifying hard look review to minimize this debilitating im-
pact without abandoning the standard altogether.
Professor McGarity views judicial review as an opportunity for judges
"who were placed upon the bench precisely because of their commitment
to private markets and their skepticism about the governmental programs
that the agencies are advancing"32 to undermine regulatory protections
that Congress intended. I do not see the federal judiciary as a monolithic
antiregulatory institution. For most judges, political considerations enter
decisions only indirectly. Politics are not an explicit concern; instead, they
color the manner in which judges view the circumstances surrounding the
rules they review. The case reporters contain numerous decisions in which
even the most zealous free-market jurists have upheld government
28. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844-45
(1984).
29. Abortion Counseling Regulations, 53 Fed. Reg. at 2925.
30. Review of agency statutory interpretation under the Chevron doctrine poses the same dilemma
as review of agency discretion for adopting rules under the hard look test. See Seidenfeld, supra note
9, at 128-29. In fact, current activist review under the first step of Chevron probably represents a
greater threat to agencies' abilities to implement their regulatory agenda than does hard look review.
See Martin Shapiro, A Golden Anniversary?: The Administrative Procedures Act of 1946, REGULATION,
1996, No. 3, at 40, 47.
31. McGarity, Response, supra note 3, at 529.
32. Id. at 530.
1997]
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regulations under hard look review.33 Moreover, many judges exhibit
proregulatory values; there are numerous examples of judges reversing
agencies for failing to regulate sufficiently under a "progressive" statutory
scheme.' Thus, I do not accept Professor McGarity's conclusion that the
goal of judges reviewing agency rules is to thwart regulatory programs.
Even if judges were solidly opposed to progressive regulation, other
reasons support the belief that the operational modifications to judicial
review that I propose are more likely to relieve the antiregulatory impact
of review than is a call for the fuzzy, albeit more deferential, pass-fail
standard of review. Of course, all else being equal, a more deferential
standard of review will lead to fewer reversals of agency rules than a more
aggressive standard. But Professor McGarity's pass-fail metaphor holds
judges to a less objectively verifiable standard than does my operationally
modified hard look review. And the greater ability to monitor judicial
deviation from my modified hard look test may more than compensate for
its lower level of deference. 35  On the one hand, a judge who is hell-bent
on stopping regulation may find it easy to do so by simply finding that the
agency has failed Professor McGarity's pass-fail test, and the only way to
criticize such a determination is to assert that the judge simply made the
wrong call. On the other hand, operational standards such as my proposal
facilitate identification of when a judge has demanded too much of an
agency. Thus, judges are more likely to pay a reputational price for
violating an operational standard than for applying a fuzzy standard in an
overly activist manner.36
33. See, e.g., American Dental Ass'nv. Martin, 984 F.2d 823, 827, 830 (7th Cir. 1993) (Posner,
J.) (finding an OSHA rule governing bloodborne pathogens reasonable except as applied to sites not
controlled by entities subject to the rule); Southwestern Bell Corp. v. FCC, 896 F.2d 1378, 1380-82
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (Silberman, J.) (affirming a rule governing transfer of assets between regulated tele-
phone companies and their unregulated affiliates as reasonable to prevent abuse of ratepayers); Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 822 F.2d 104, 117-21 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Starr, J.)
(upholding as reasonable a rule requiring that point sources of water pollution provide the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) with a list of toxic substances that each source uses or
manufactures); see also City of Las Vegas v. Lujan, 891 F.2d 927, 932-35 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(Silberman, J.) (applying a deferential standard to an emergency rule listing the Mojave Desert
population of the desert tortoise as an endangered species).
34. Contrary to Professor McGarity's beliefs about judicial review, Shep Melnick found that
federal appellate courts' judicial review of the EPA's Clean Air Act regulations "strengthened the
EPA's 'lean' toward stringent standards." R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE
CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR AcT 355 (1983).
35. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in
Substantive Review ofAdminlnistrative Decisions, 44 DuKE L.J. 1051, 1058-60 (1995) (predicting that
judges will more likely decide cases based on their desires about substantive outcomes when standards
of review are indeterminate); see also Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial Review of Agency Action: The
Problems of Commitment, Non-Contractibility, and the Proper Incentives, 44 DuKE L.J. 1133, 1150
(1995) (criticizing Shapiro and Levy's proposed standards for judicial review as too indeterminate to
constrain judges).
36. See Shapiro & Levy, supra note 35, at 1067 (contending that "judges are freer to pursue an
outcome orientation" when the determinate standard is unclear).
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V. Conclusion
In his response to my primary article, Professor McGarity has raised
concerns that hard look review, even as I suggested modifying it, would
continue to paralyze agency rulemaking proceedings. Although I share
some of Professor McGarity's concerns, given the time and space con-
straints on my response, I had to content myself with answering his most
fundamental points. My thoughts on other interesting questions raised by
Professor McGarity's response, such as whether the opinions in Corrosion
Proof Fittings v. EPA37 and AFL-CIO v. OSHA38 represent judicial over-
reaching rather than proper responses to inappropriate deliberative shortcuts
taken by agencies, will have to await another day.
Ultimately, I believe that much of the disagreement between Professor
McGarity and me hinges on different estimates of the benefits and costs
that hard look review bestows on the rulemaking process. We both agree
that hard look review, as traditionally applied, has unnecessarily chilled
agency rulemaking. Questions such as the impact that either Professor
McGarity's pass-fail test or my modified hard look review would have on
the quality and quantity of agency rulemaking are empirical questions that
cannot be answered without courts first trying out some of our ideas for
relieving the burdens imposed by hard look review as applied over the past
two decades. My modest hope is only that our exchange will stimulate a
carefully considered judicial response to the problem of hard look review,
rather than simply a judicial abandonment of meaningful review of the
rulemaking process altogether.
37. 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991).
38. 965 F.2d 962 (11th Cir. 1992).
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